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COMMERCIAL BAD FAITH IN THE LAW OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
EDWARD T. FAGAN, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH it is generally accepted today that a subjective standard
1 is essential for the correct determinations of good and bad faith in
negotiable instruments law, the subjective element seems to have been
non-existent in the law merchant as an aid in establishing due course
holding.' The main concern of the merchants was whether the purchaser
took the instrument in the regular course of trade. If he did not take the
paper in such manner then the transfer was subject to ordinary common
law property rules. No other result was possible since the parties involved
had failed to conform to the usages and customs of commerce and con-
sequently were unable to fulfill the requirements necessary to establish
their transactions as within the law merchant. Law merchant rules were
inapplicable because such law pertained only to recognized commercial
transactions between merchants.
When the common law judges incorporated the law merchant into their
system, many of them sought to restate this course of business taking re-
quirement by ruling that any purchase of a negotiable instrument out-
side the ordinary course of the purchaser's business was made in
commercial bad faith, regardless of possible subjective faith.- Whether
these holdings were an accurate restatement of the law merchant require-
ment depends upon the correct determination of what constitutes taking
a negotiable instrument within the ordinary course of business.
II. THE PROBLEM
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (hereinafter referred to as
the N.I.L.) makes no express recognition of a course of business taking
requirement in its holder in due course definition.3 The failure of the
statute to speak directly in this regard has led to much legal speculation
as to whether the requirement should be read into the N.I.L. by implica-
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1. "The early courts do not appear to have questioned what they meant by 'good faith.'
Nor to have stated just how nearly dosed a purchaser might keep his eyes and still be
deemed not to have 'notice' of 'infirmities' or of 'defects' in title, to use the language of
N.I.L. sec. 52(4). Or, of 'facts making the transfer wrongful,' to quote from the Transfer
Act. Probably they meant some such thing as the good faith of the regular course of busi-
ness." Steffen, Cases on Commercial and Investment Paper 585 (2d ed. 1954).
2. Roberts v. Hall, 37 Conn. 205 (1870). See Fehr v. Campbell, 285 Pa. 549, 137 At.
113 (1927).
3. Negotiable Instruments Law § 52. (Corresponding state statutes to the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instrument Law may be found in 5 U.L.A. XV.)
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tion or whether it was intentionally excluded.4 On this point, Professor
Beutel, who is usually critical of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
agrees with its draftsmen' in their insistence that the treatment of the
matter has remained unchanged in the majority of jurisdictions since
the enactment of the N.I.L. and that a taking in the course of the pur-
chaser's business is just as much a requirement of due course holding
today as it was under the law merchant." An acceptance of this con-
tention, however, leads directly to what seems to be a contradiction within
existing law.
7
If taking within the course of the purchaser's business is a requirement
in all cases for due course holding by business men,'then if an ordinary
business man in the same business would not have taken the instrument
under the circumstances, the taking is outside the regular course of
business and the taker is not a holder in due course. Under such a require-
ment the circumstances surrounding the purchase transaction are con-
clusive in themselves in the determination of due course holding. If they
establish a course of business taking, the commercial purchaser is pro-
tected with little more than lip service paid to his actual bona fides
because commercial good faith is said to exist.8
Such a requirement seems completely inconsistent with the common law
decision to facilitate the acceptance and expedite the transfer of com-
mercial paper by absolving the ordinary purchaser from any duty to
determine its validity by investigation. The notice standard adopted
to insure such result requires only that the purchaser have no actual
knowledge of facts establishing a defense to or defect in the instrument
and that he take it in good faith. Investigation not being a requirement
under such standard, facts or circumstances which in themselves fail to
establish actual knowledge or bad faith, have no bearing upon the de-
termination of due course holding.9
4. American Bank v. McComb, 105 Va. 473, 54 S.E. 14 (1906).
5. Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, and The Negotiable
Instruments Law, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 531, 546 (1951).
6. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-302, comment.
7. The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code solution to the problem is discussed and
rejected by the writer in Fagan, Notice and Good Faith in Article 3 of the U.C.C., 17 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 176 (1956).
8. "The triumph of the good faith purchaser has been one of the most dramatic episodes
in our legal history. In his several guises, he serves a commercial function: he is protected
not because of his praiseworthy character, but to the end that commercial transactions may
be engaged in without elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the
possession of property by one who offers it for sale or to secure a loan. As the doctrine
strikes roots in one or another field, the 'good faith' component tends to atrophy and the com-
mercial purchaser is protected with little more than lip service paid to his 'bona fides.'"
Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057 (1954).
9. In general see Fagan, Notice and the Endorsing Fiduciary, 30 St. John's L. Rev. 153
<1956).
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It is obvious that to require a taking within the course of the pur-
chaser's business makes circumstances connected with the negotiable
instrument purchase transaction conclusive in themselves on the question
of due course holding regardless of the purchaser's lack of actual knowl-
edge of defense or title defect. It is equally obvious that the notice
standard of negotiability makes such circumstances immaterial on the
same question unless they establish actual knowledge in the ordinary
purchaser of defense or title defect. Presuming that a course of business
taking is to be retained as a prerequisite for due course holding since it
was so essentially part of the law merchant, the seemingly insoluble prob-
lem which arises from these observations is how to apply both the require-
ment and the actual knowledge notice standard to the ordinary purchaser
without contradiction being the inevitable result in many cases.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Commercial paper was originated to facilitate the transfer of credits
between merchants.' In this regard, upon the original issue of a bill, the
taker is a transferee of the credits it represents but not a purchaser of
the paper since he is its first owner. Consequently, if the original issue
is made as a medium of exchange for a transaction outside the ordinary
course of the drawee's business, the initial taking is not within the scope
of business because the only transaction involved is one which violates
commercial custom or usage. However, the basic facts change once the
negotiable instrument has been issued. It then becomes a species of
property in its own right' although this fact has been generally disre-
garded in judicial determinations of whether it has been taken in the
course of business. It is usually considered unimportant that a discount
is involved rather than an initial delivery.'- It is unfortunate that this
10. First Natl Bank v. Skeen, 101 Mo. 6S3, 14 SV. 732 (IS90).
11. Britton, Bills and Notes § 100 (1943).
12. There are several notable exceptions, however. Express recognition was made of
the course of the discount trade in Briggs v. Merrill, 58 Barb. (N.Y.) 389 (1870), wherein the
court, in discussing a holder who acquired the instrument by operation of law, stated at
page 399, "The principle established is that neither the payee nor any holder who is not
an innocent bona fide holder for value, before the note becomes due, can enforce its colc-
tion, against the maker. The law will not aid in carrying out any portion of the fraudulent
bargain, but will leave all the parties who are chargeable with notice, to rely upon the option
of the maker for the performance of the apparent obligation. The receiver does not stand
in the situation of an innocent bona fide holder for value. He acquires title by legal proce:s,
and not in the regular course of dealing in commercial paper."
In Kellogg v. Curtis, 69 Me. 212 (1879), the court stated at page 214, "The purchase by an
indorsee, must be 'in the usual course of business.' These words are usually defined to mean
'according to the usages and customs of commercial transactions.' If the plaintiff purchased
the note before maturity for value, that would be such a transaction."
In Crosby v. Grant, 36 N.H. 273 (1858) the court recognized the importance of dis-
1956]
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property aspect of the negotiable instrument, achieved through the evolu-
tion of issue, has received such scant attention in this connection because
its basic importance in relation to course of business determination can-
not be overemphasized. It is the one attribute of issued negotiable paper
that distinguishes it from a mere exchange medium and thus serves to
separate the discount transaction from transactions which relate to it.
A medium of exchange as such has no intrinsic value. It is not a com-
modity and cannot properly be the subject of a purchase transaction.
The transfer of money, just as the transfer of credits by the original issue
of a bill, is merely a means of providing representative value to bind or
conclude a commercial transaction. That which is transferred is not
valuable in itself. On the other hand, the negotiable instrument, once
issued, is properly the subject in itself of a course of trade. In fact, the
commercially recognized method of transferring such instrument has
always been by a negotiation for value. 3 It necessarily follows from
these conclusions that receipt of value for a negotiation after issue is all
that is necessary to establish the transfer as one within the ordinary
course of business. The specific business or trade involved is that of
discounting commercial paper.14 It further follows that the ordinary trans-
counting upon course of business taking in the following paragraphs at page 278, "But it Is
contended by the defendant that the court erred in limiting their instructions to the inquiry
by the jury whether the plaintiff had knowledge of the defect in the note, and that they
should have been instructed that if the plaintiff did not take it in the usual course of busi-
ness, or if the circumstances under which he took it were such as to put him on inquiry,
it was subject to the defense, in the same manner as if he had knowledge.
"The general proposition that the note, in order that it may be protected against equities
as between prior parties, must be taken in the usual course of business, is undoubtedly cor-
rect. If it be received on any other footing than as a bona fide purchase by the holder,
independent of any previous connection with it, or with any of the parties upon it, so that
he does not take it as such paper ordinarily passes from the holder to the indorser upon a
purchase and sale of the security, then he takes it, not in the usual course of business, and
consequently subject to the same defenses as if negotiated after dishonor. It passes as com-
mercial paper, protected by the law merchant from such defenses, when, at any time before
dishonor, it is purchased in good faith and transferred to the hands of a purchaser, as a
new holder for value, without knowledge of an existing defect. And it is immaterial at what
time it may be thus purchased and transferred, if only it be before it becomes dishonored.
It must be understood, upon the case presented, that it came to the hands of the plaintiff
as a purchaser for value, in the mode in which such negotiable paper is ordinarily transferred
by one, being the holder, to his indorsee upon a sale."
See also, Parsons v. Utica Cement Co. 82 Conn. 333, 73 Atl. 785 (1909) ; Christianson v.
Farmer's Warehouse Ass'n, 5 N.D. 438, 67 N.W. 300 (1896) ; Merchants' Bank v. McClelland,
9 Colo. 608, 13 Pac. 723 (1887).
13. See Jenks, Early History of Negotiable Instruments, 9 L.Q. Rev. 70, 85 (1893).
14. Some indication of the present volume of a portion of this trade is revealed by the
following excerpt from the Wall Street Journal: "investors began to balk at the return they
were getting on commercial paper in December and the amount outstanding dropped below
a month-earlier and year-ago levels, according to the New York Federal Reserve Bank.
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feree, merely by paying such value, qualifies as one who takes within the
course of this trade."5
The situation is not complicated by the fact that the concept of value
in negotiable instruments law extends beyond money to include anything
sufficient to bind an ordinary contract.'0 Frequently the transferee in-
stead of giving money, employs a separate transaction between him and
the transferor as the basis for this value. Despite the fact that the
separate transaction may in itself be outside a course of trade, the course
of business taking of the instrument is not affected since value is given for
its transfer and the means by which this giving is accomplished is im-
material on the due course taking issue. A contrary conclusion is reached
by those holdings which require, as a further prerequisite for such taking,
that the transferee conform to the custom and practice of his particular
business in respect to the transaction which leads to the purchase of the
paper. The following simple example serves to illustrate the error
in the reasoning of such holdings and at the same time to demonstrate
the validity of the opposite conclusion.
The bulk sale of an entire stock in trade and fixtures by way of wind-
ing up a business is a transfer outside the ordinary course of trade. It is
so identified by statute 7 primarily to protect the seller's creditors by re-
quiring the prospective purchaser to give them notice of the sale before
it is concluded. Consequently, any buyer in bulk, who fails to comply
with bulk sales statutes is accountable to the creditors of the seller for
all material acquired under such sale. If the bulk buyer gives an already
issued negotiable instrument as value to conclude the bulk sale, there exists
no advantage or reason for labeling the transfer of the instrument as
outside the course of trade because the circumstances surrounding the
bulk sale transaction and the discount transaction caution only that
the title to the goods and fixtures may be defective-not the title to the
"The bank estimated commercial paper outstanding at the end of December amounted to
$1,924,000,00--a decline of 57 from November and 2% below December 1953 levels.
"Commercial paper is the money market name for short-term unsecured notes of leading
business concerns. Industrial companies and smaller finance companies which borrow on com-
mercial paper sell their notes to dealers who resell them to investors." Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 18, 1955, p. 16, col. 4.
15. "It is said, however, that the note was not purchased in the usual courre of businezs;
that the plaintiff was not engaged in the business of purchasing notes. The phrase, 'in the
usual course of business,' signifies, 'according to the usages and customs of commercial
transactions,' and its application to the purchase of a mercantile note is not confined to per-
sons engaged habitually in banking or purchasing notes. One who in good faith purchases a
negotiable note before maturity, for value, or who takes it in payment of an antecedent debt,
is not out of the usual course of business." Tescher v. Mlerea, 118 Ind. 586, 21 N.. 316
(1889).
16. Negotiable Instruments Law § 25.
17. N.Y. Personal Property Law § 44.
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instrument. Consequently the seller of the bulk goods should be able to
claim that he took the instrument within the course of trade involving
commercial paper discount because he gave value for it at the time of
transfer. The effect of the bulk sale upon the transfer of the instrument
in this example should be no more than to establish the fact that value ac-
companied the negotiation. While it is true that the course of business
aspect of the related transaction may be pertinent for jury consideration on
the question of the purchaser's good or bad faith in the discount transaction,
at most it is only an evidentiary fact and not conclusive in itself on the
question of due course holding.'"
By distinguishing between the original issue of a negotiable instrument
and its discount after issue, it can be established that the requirement of
a course of business taking when applied to negotiable instruments will
not necessarily conflict with the notice standard of negotiability. The
course of trade in which the taker is primarily engaged has no relation-
ship to the course of trade involving the discount of commercial paper
unless the taker is in the discounting business. Consequently, if the taker
is not in such business, then as long as the commercially recognized
method of transferring such paper is employed, the requirement of a
course of business taking is fufilled. The only circumstance which is
conclusive on the question of such taking is whether value is given for
the instrument. Since the giving of value is essential, along with lack
of notice, to establish any due course holding, it follows that both the
actual knowledge notice standard and the course of business taking re-
quirement can be made applicable in all due course taking determinations
involving holders other than those in the business of discounting com-
mercial paper.
IV. COURSE OF TRADE TAKING IN COMMON LAW
While those not otherwise engaged in the business of negotiable in-
strument discount may, as an incident to or even outside of their primary
18. The most recent expression of the New York Court of Appeals which bears on the
subject is Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 306 N.Y. 336, 118 N.E.2d 464 (1954). The case treated
of a grocer to whom a man named Gallegos owed a grocery bill of $100. Gallegos gave the
grocer a cashier's check for $1,000 originally payable to Gallegos, which Gallegos had obtained
from the defendant bank. The grocer in turn gave the debtor $880 in currency, $20 In
groceries, and a settlement of the old grocery bill.
The court allowed the grocer to enforce the cashier's check against the issuing Bank of
Blasdell, despite the fact that the reverse of the check bore the endorsement of the original
payee to an automobile dealer in full payment for a Nash car and a reindorsement in blank
by the dealer. This extraordinary story of negotiation, which possibly would have alerted
a reasonable man to hidden dangers, was only material to the grocer's actual good faith
since the facts established that the related transaction was one within the ordinary course
of business. Here the court correctly distinguished between the discount and the grocery
sale and the "commercial good faith" trap was avoided.
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business, enter into its course of trade merely by employing its trade
procedure of negotiation for value, it would seem that the interests of
commerce demand that something more than mere compliance with
transfer procedure be required of those whose business is primarily that
of discounting commercial paper. In line with this observation it is sub-
mitted that an analysis of the English law wherein the rule of negoti-
ability was formulated, with particular emphasis on the case of Gill v.
Cubitt, will furnish proof that purchasers who are primarily in the
business of discount may be required to conform to the reasonable stand-
ards of such business in order to establish their due course holding status.
Furthermore, the analysis will show that this requirement does not con-
flict with the reasoning which motivated the actual knowledge notice
standard, normally so essential for negotiability.
A. Origin Cases
The earliest recorded English cases which express the rule of negotiability
state that if value is given for commercial paper, the course of such trade
creates an instrument property right in the purchaser which is superior
even to that of its true owner.' It is important to note that these decisions
make no reference to a course of trade other than that of discounting the
paper itself. Of equal importance is the fact that in no case was the pur-
chaser a party who was primarily in the business of discounting com-
mercial paper. As a result, there was no necessity in these origin cases to
establish other than purchaser compliance with transfer procedure. This
was done by finding that the transfer was made for a valuable considera-
tion. The Anonymous case in 1 Salkeld,2 which is a typical example of
these early expressions, is brief enough to state in its entirety:
"A bank bill payable to A or bearer, being given to A and lost, was found by a
stranger, who transferred it to C for a valuable consideration. C got a new bill in his
own name. Et per Holt, C.J. A may have trover against the stranger who found the
bill for he had not title, though the payment to him would have indemnified the bank;
but A cannot maintain trover against C, by reason of the course of trade, which creates
a property in the assignee or bearer."
B. Miller v. Race
It was not until the case of Miller v. Race, -2 decided by Lord Mans-
field some fifty years after the rule of negotiability was first promulgated
in the common law that any mention appears of a requirement that to
19. 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. S06 (K.B. 1824).
20. Hinton's Case, 2 Show. 236, 89 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1632); Hodges v. Steward, 1
Salk. 125, 91 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B. 1692); Hussey v. Jacob, I Comyns 4, 92 Eng. Rep. 929
(K.B. 1697); Lambert v. Pack, 1 Salk. 127, 91 Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B. 1700); Hill v. Lewis,
1 Salk. 132, 91 Eng. Rep. 124 (KB. 1709).
21. 1 Salk. 126, 91 Eng. Rep. 118 (KB. 1698).
22. 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
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come within the rule the purchaser must acquire the instrument within
the course of his particular business. This case involved bank notes which
had been stolen from the mails and which the plaintiff had acquired for
value. Lord Mansfield stated, "It (the bank note) never shall be followed
into the hands of a person who bona fide took it in the course of currency,
and in the way of his business. '2 3
This statement by Lord Mansfield must be read with an awareness that
the instrument to which it referred was a bank note and not a bill of
exchange. There is a broad distinction between these two instruments.
A bank note, particularly a Bank of England note, has always been
treated commercially as the equivalent of cash and categorized as a
medium of exchange. A bank bill, such as that dealt with in the Anony-
mous case or a bill of exchange, is essentially a different type of instru-
ment.24 A man does not take a bill as cash; but he discounts it, and by
so doing becomes its purchaser, taking it within the course of such trade.
The Chief Justice stressed this feature of the bank note in the following
words:
"It has been very ingeniously argued by Sir Richard Lloyd for the defendant. But
the whole fallacy of the argument turns upon comparing bank notes to what they do
not resemble, and what they ought not to be compared to, viz. to goods, or to securities,
or documents for debts.
"Now they are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor are so
esteemed; but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course and transaction of
business, by the general consent of mankind; which gives them the credit and currency
of money, to all intents and purposes. They are as much money, as guineas themselves
are; or any other current coin, that is used in common payments, as money or cash."125
Since the bank note was acknowledged to be a medium of exchange,
it was not properly the subject of a purchase transaction and Lord Mans-
field was correct in holding that the validity of its transfer was governed
by the transaction which it served to bind or conclude. Had such transac-
tion been outside the ordinary course of the transferee's business, it is evi-
dent that the original owner of the notes would have been entitled to their
return.
It is interesting to note that Miller v. Race is the forerunner of those
cases which are usually cited to prove that actual knowledge of defense
or title defect is the sole notice standard for the negotiable instrument.
Particularly is it interesting on this point because although it categorized
the bank note as currency and therefore absolved its taker from any in-
vestigatory duty prior to its acquisition, it did not specify that other
23. Id. at 458, 97 Eng. Rep. at 402.
24. "The notes of goldsmiths (whether they be payable to order or to bearer) are always
accounted among merchants as ready cash, and not as bills of exchange." Tassell & Lee v.
Lewis, 1 Ld. Raym. 744, 91 Eng. Rep. 1397 (1696).
25. 1 Burr. at 457, 97 Eng. Rep. at 401.
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types of negotiable instruments were to receive similar treatment. It
would seem that Lord Mansfield intended the currency analogy to apply
only to the bank note by the very fact that he stressed the course of
business of the individual taker in connection with its acquisition. -10
It may well be argued that Miller v. Race is authority only for the prin-
ciple that no duty of investigation exists prior to the taking of bank notes,
as distinguished from other types of negotiable instruments.
While it is arguable that the promissory note and bill of exchange,
after issue, are not within the principle of Miller v. Race, it must have
been apparent to Lord Mansfield that to require an investigatory duty of
the ordinary purchasers of these instruments would greatly impede com-
mercial growth. Credit is, and always has been, a vital necessity to ex-
panding industry and volume business. Credit lies in the ability of
merchants to negotiate commercial paper between themselves freely and
without delay. If English trade was to obtain the credit so essential for
large scale operation and if a prompt response to credit demands was to be
insured, then the business man had to receive legal assurance that a min-
imum risk would be assumed by his participation in credit transactions.
C. Peacock v. Rhodes
Twenty-three years elapsed before Lord Mansfield had an opportunity,
in Peacock v. Rhodes, 7 to extend the rule of Miller v. Race to include
all negotiable instruments. This case involved a stolen bill of exchange,
endorsed in blank, which was negotiated to the plaintiff cloth merchant
in exchange for money and cloth. The transferor was unknown to the
plaintiff at the time of the sale and the defendant drawer argued that
the failure to investigate prior to purchase should defeat the holder's
claim. He distinguished Miller v. Race on the ground that it pertained
only to bank notes and not to bills or promissory notes.
Lord Mansfield held that while the fact that the bill was purchased
from a stranger was material for jury consideration on the question of bad
faith, the jury having concluded that it was taken in good faith and
received in the course of trade, the case came within the principle of
Miller v. Race.
Although by so ruling, the Chief Justice succeeded in giving the or-
26. The fact that the negotiability of bank notes depended upon the currency analogy
whereas the negotiability of bills of exchange stemmed from the law merchant was recognized
in Wookey v. Pole, 4 B. & Aid. 1, 105 Eng. Rep. 839 (K.B. 1820). The court stated at
page 15, "The holder, bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, of a bank note or a bill
of exchange, has a good title against all the world; because in the case of bank notes, they
are considered as money and pass as such and it is essential for the purposes of trade, that
delivery should give perfect title and because in the case of bills of exchange, this is the
law and custom of merchants... 21
27. 2 Doug. 633, 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781).
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
dinary purchasers of bills of exchange the same notice protection he had
previously afforded transferees of bank notes, it is to be noted that he
accomplished the result by a different approach. In Miller v. Race it was
immaterial that a stranger transferred the bank note because it was used
as a medium of exchange. There the sole issue was whether the transac-
tion which the bank note served to conclude was within the ordinary
course of the transferee's business. In Peacock v. Rhodes, the fact that a
stranger was the transferor became material on the question of bad faith.
This was so because the bill itself was the subject of the sale in issue as
distinguished from the sale of the cloth which related to but was separate
from the discount transaction." The fact that a stranger bought the cloth
was certainly immaterial on the question of whether the sale of the cloth
was within the ordinary course of the plaintiff's business.
When Lord Mansfield mentioned that the jury had determined the
good faith of the purchaser and found that the instrument had been
received in the course of trade, he was in effect stating that the jury was
influenced on the good faith question by the fact that the transaction
which related to the discount was one within the ordinary course of the
purchaser's business. This makes sense because if the jury was seeking
to determine whether the purchaser took the instrument in good faith,
the fact that the related transaction was within the ordinary course of his
business was evidence tending to prove such lack of knowledge. On
the other hand, if the related transaction had been outside the course
of the cloth business, such fact would have been pertinent on the question
of legal bad faith but certainly not strong evidence. It is therefore un-
fortunate that the charge given to the jury is not stated and apparently
has never been available.
D. Lawson v. Weston
Despite these admirable efforts of Lord Mansfield to delineate the
rule of negotiability and accurately define its notice standard, the erro-
neous reasoning in the subsequent case of Lawson v. Weston"' created
confusion once again in the English law regarding the proper application
of the rule in the evolving commercial era. The case concerned a plain-
tiff banking house which had discounted a bill of exchange from a stranger
without inquiry. The bill having been lost, its holder had requested the
defendant acceptors to stop payment. The defendants attempted to offer
evidence that when bills were offered for discount to bankers, it was the
28. Professor Rightmire overlooked this important distinction between Miller v. Race and
Peacock v. Rhodes since he erroneously concluded that both cases involved bills of exchango
See Rightmire, The Doctrine of Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 18 Mich.
L. Rev. 355, 357 (1920).
29. 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (Nisi Prius 1801).
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usual practice of the banking trade that the bankers investigate both
the bills and the persons offering them, prior to purchase. The purpose of
this evidence was to establish that the purchase was not within the course
of such trade because no investigation had been made and, therefore,
the purchasing banker did not acquire a proper title. The facts afforded
a perfect opportunity for a court to distinguish between the duty of the
banker and the duty of the ordinary purchaser of commercial paper in
respect to participation in the course of the discount trade.
Rather than make this distinction, Lord Kenyon excluded the evidence
on the ground that the point was settled by the case of Miller v. Race. He
decided that since the plaintiff had paid value for the instrument and taken
it without actual knowledge of the title defect, the purchase was protected
by the rule of negotiability. It is submitted that the error in the decision
lay in his failure to appreciate that the excluded evidence pertained to the
course of the discount trade, which was the very trade that was the basis
of the rule of negotiability. Certainly, if the common law required that
the negotiable instrument be taken within the course of trade as a prereq-
uisite to the application of the rule of negotiability then if the taker was
in the discount trade and claimed the discount was made pursuant to such
trade, evidence of the practice of those similarly engaged was highly
material on the question of whether the rule was applicable. The issue
of a course of business taking may be dismissed, however, by concluding
from Lord Kenyon's decision that it was. no longer to be a requirement
of due course holding. If so, then it is further submitted that the decision
is still incorrect because the actual knowledge notice standard which
normally accompanies the rule of negotiability cannot be properly applied
to the purchase of negotiable instruments by those engaged in the banking
business.
The redemption of negotiable bank notes by bankers comes within the
ruling of Miller v. Race because the currency analogy drawn by that case
would fail unless an issuing bank could redeem such notes without the
necessity of investigation prior to redemption. However, redemption
is quite distinguishable from purchase. When a negotiable instrument,
other than a bank note, is offered to a banking institution for discount,
the interests of commerce demand that an investigatory duty be made
applicable to such purchase. Banks and investment houses are the deposi-
taries of the nation's wealth. The maintenance of a sound national
financial structure requires that extraordinary precautions be taken
both legislatively and judicially to insure the fact that these depositaries
exercise extreme care and discretion in all monetary operations.-^ Only
30. The importance of this has been recognized by Congress in its enactment of detailed
banking legislation. See 12 U.S.CA. (1952).
1956]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in this manner may the funds of modern commerce be adequately pro-
tected, for they are in the hands of the nations' bankers.
Apart from the economic danger, it is legally objectionable to permit
financial institutions to purchase commercial paper without prior investi-
gation into its validity. The money used by banks in making such
purchase has been committed to their care by the depositors. Despite the
debtor creditor relationship which legal analysis has established as created
by the deposit, courts have always looked upon banks as custodians
of funds and have treated them accordingly.31 The duty of care required
by law of all custodians of funds is indeed violated by bringing the use
of such money within a notice standard that condones even negligence.
It is arguable, therefore, that this condonation of negligent purchase is not
intended for the protection of bankers but for those business men who are
not equipped with the investigatory machinery that is a necessary part
of the banking trade or with the experience that normally results from a
participation in it. If the ordinary business man was required to conform
to the investigatory duty which should be demanded of the banker, then
the discounting of negotiable commercial paper would be limited to the
financial houses, for only they have the means to promptly and properly
perform such duty. This limitation would in effect abolish many of the
benefits to commerce which were intended by the rule of negotiability.
E. Gill v. Cubitt
It is quite understandable, in'light of the effect which Lawson v. Weston
must have had upon the discount trade, that when Gill v. Cubitt,,2 which
involved a similar fact situation, came before the Kings Bench in 1824,
the court took occasion to comment, "I think the sooner it is known that
the case of Lawson v. Weston is doubted, at least by this court, the
better."33
31. "A deposit is where a sum of money is left with a banker for safekeeping, subject
to order, and payable, not in the specific money deposited, but in an equal sum. It may or
may not bear interest, according to the agreement. While the relation between the depositor
and his banker is that of debtor or creditor simply, the transaction cannot in any proper
sense be regarded as a loan, unless the money is left, not for safe-keeping, but for a fixed
period at interest, in which case the transaction assumes all the characteristics of a loan."
Law's Estate, 144 Pa. 499, 507, 22 Atl. 831, 832 (1891).
"When the personal property involved is money, it may be difficult, under some circum-
stances, to determine whether the transaction should be called a deposit or a loan; but the
two are not the same, and are never so regarded by anyone in business, or the ordinary
affairs of life. Certainly the thousands who daily deliver money to banks for safe-keeping,
and return in corresponding currency, do not regard the transaction as a loan, nor do they so
speak of it .... A deposit is for the benefit of the depositor; a loan, for the benefit of the
borrower. It is true, a deposit may also benefit the depositary but such is not the primary
object of the transaction." Allibone v. Ames, 9 S.D. 74, 68 N.W. 165, 166 (1896).
32. 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1884).
33. Id. at 472, 107 Eng. Rep. at 809.
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Gill v. Cubitt involved a stolen bill of exchange which was discounted
by the plaintiff bill broker without making any inquiry of the person who
brought it for discount. The defendant acceptor argued that the propriety
of Lawson v. Weston had always been doubted and that to absolve a
banker or bill broker from any duty of investigation prior to the discount
of commercial paper would be the equivalent of authorizing him to
advertise: "Bills discounted for persons whose features are known, and
no questions asked."'
At last the high court of England had the opportunity to clearly define
the limitations of the notice standard of the rule of negotiability. Not
only was the opportunity available, but the Kings Bench had been alerted
by problems resulting from a prior decisional error. This error could
have been rectified and the necessary clarification accomplished by simply
ruling that the plaintiff in the above fact situation was a bill broker and,
as such, was engaged primarily in the trade of discounting commercial
paper. Since discounting without inquiry was not in conformity with the
ordinary practice of those primarily engaged in this trade, the plaintiff
took the instrument outside the ordinary course of business and was,
therefore, not a holder in due course.
The court could have taken judicial notice of the fact that the ordinary
and proper practice of those engaged in the banking business was to in-
quire into the validity and title of commercial paper prior to purchase
because such duty was required of them by law as custodians of funds.
Since bankers form the greatest percentage of those primarily engaged in
the business of discount, the failure of the bill broker to make inquiry
prior to discount would be a violation of such general trade practice. It
could have concluded, by way of dictum, that bankers were not subject
to an inquiry duty in respect to bank notes because such notes were the
equivalent of currency and thus distinguishable from other types of
negotiable instruments.
Unfortunately, this was not the reasoning employed by the Kings
Bench to justify its decision in Gill v. Cubitt that the plaintiff was not a
holder in due course. The court ruled instead that no purchaser could
in law be considered as acting in good faith, or with due caution or dili-
gence, if he took a bill of exchange without inquiry into its validity or title
prior to the purchase. It is frustrating to realize that the ruling was
motivated primarily by the particular facts with which the bench was
dealing. While the conclusion was certainly correct in the individual
case, it was completely erroneous as a general principle since it destroyed
the effectiveness of the rule of negotiability.
The real basis for the error in the decision lay in the court's failure
34. Id. at 469, 107 Eng. Rep. at SOS.
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to appreciate that discounting commercial paper is a course of trade in
itself. Justice Bayley, in his concurring opinion, stated:
"If there was not due caution used, the plaintiff has not discounted this bill in the
usual and ordinary course of business, or in the way in which business properly and
rightly conducted would have required. But it is said that the question usually sub-
mitted for the consideration of the jury in cases of this description, up to the period
of time at which my Lord Chief Justice's direction was given, has been whether the
bill was taken bona fide, and whether a valuable consideration was given for it. I
admit that has been generally the case; but I consider it was parcel of the bona fides
whether the plaintiff had asked all those questions which, in the ordinary and proper
manner in which trade is conducted, a party ought to ask." 35
It has already been established by this analysis that the reason why
juries were ordinarily asked to determine only whether value had been
given in good faith was because all the cases, with the exception of Lawson
v. Weston, had involved purchasers who were not in the business of com-
mercial paper discount. Had Justice Bayley made this distinction, he
could have correctly based his conclusion on the fact that the taking was
not in conformity with discount trade practice, regardless of bona fides,
and thus avoided the good faith issue. It is submitted that if he had done
so, much of the present day legal conflict on these points would never have
arisen. Certainly there would have been no necessity for the legal struggle
in the decade that followed to free the commercial world from harsh con-
sequences of the "suspicious circumstances" doctrine which the case
established.
V. COURSE OF TRADE TAKING IN PRESENT LAW
In its anxiety to defeat this erroneous constructive notice doctrine the
English Bench almost blindly embraced the opposite extreme. Good faith
and lack of actual knowledge in the purchaser were soon established as
the only material considerations in any due course holding determina-
tion.36 Since this accentuation of the subjective standard resulted in the
almost total exclusion of objective criteria, the vast majority of common
law judges abandoned any conscious effort to apply the law merchant
course of trade taking requirement in a manner which would in any way
limit the actual knowledge notice standard. As a consequence, the banker
was afforded the same legal protection as any other negotiable instrument
purchaser.3
7
The few British and American jurists who conscientiously continued
their efforts to properly apply the requirement were forced to word their
35. Id. at 473, 107 Eng. Rep. at 809.
36. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Q.B. 1836); Uther v. Rich,
10 A. & E. 784, 113 Eng. Rep. 297 (Q.B. 1839); May v. Chapman, 16 M. & W. 355, 153
Eng. Rep. 1225 (Ex. 1847).
37. Bank of Bengal v. Fagan, 7 Moo. P.C. 61, 13 Eng. Rep. 802 (Privy Council 1849).
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opinions in a manner innocuous enough to survive reversal on any issue.o
of constructive notice. Due to this impediment, they relied upon such
vague notions as "commercial bad faith" to justify their attempts to dis-
tinguish between the due course holder status of ordinary purchasers and
those primarily in the business of commercial paper discount. Unfor-
tunately their reasoning did not permit the formulation of a general
principle since, by making good faith the sole issue, their conclusions were
confined to the individual cases. This restricted approach, which finds
its appearance notably in New York law, can best be illustrated by
several New York opinions written both before and after the N.I.L.
The case of Canajoharie National Bank v. Diefendorf,35 involved a
plaintiff bank which had purchased a usurious promissory note from
a stranger without inquiry and which sought to avoid the defense of usury
on the ground that it was a holder in due course. In affirming the judg-
ment entered upon- the verdict in favor of the defendant, the court stated:
"Vithout being called upon to make the explanation usually required by banking
institutions in respect to the most ordinary transactions of every-day customers, this
stranger, it is claimed, walked into a national bank and converted his feloniously
acquired property into money, without difficulty or delay. Common prudence, and a
decent regard for the rights of those who might be injured by his conduct, required
more than this from the least scrupulous of men, and much more it would seem from
the managers of a chartered financial institution. Such institutions have no right to
advertise the purchase by them of unlawfully-acquired notes, bonds or negotiable
paper, without inquiry or question. Neither have they the right to deal in such securi-
ties in defiance of the salutary rules regulating the acquisition of title to personal
property. It cannot be seriously contended that a business carried on in such a manner
is conducted according to the usual and ordinary course of such institutions, within
the meaning of those words as used in relation to transfers of personal property. Prom-
issory notes purchased at an usurious and illegal rate of interest before inception, and
being void in the hands of their transferrer, under circumstances so strange and unusual
as accompanied this transaction, cannot be said, as matter of law, to have been acquired
in good faith, in the usual course of business.",32
Thirty years later the identical reasoning is found in a lower court
opinion, subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division. In Morris v.
Muir,4 the defendant stockbrokers had established a department prima-
rily for the buying and selling of Liberty Loan Bonds. The plaintiff's
fifteen year old son had stolen several of her bonds and presented them
to the defendants who bought them without inquiry. In allowing a
recovery by the plaintiff and overruling the defendants' contention that
they were holders in due course, the court stated:
38. 123 N.Y. 191, 25 N.E. 402 (IS90).
39. Id. at 199, 25 N.E. at 404.
40. 111 Misc. 739, 181 N.Y. Supp. 913 (N.Y. Munic. CL 1920), afl'd, 191 App. Div. 947,
181 N.Y. Supp. 945 (1st Dept 1920).
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"The manner in which the defendants conducted their Liberty Loan department
provided an easy way for thieves to dispose of their plunder. It is a case of 'no
questions asked.' I do not for a moment wish to charge the defendants with the inten-
tion of extending an invitation to bond thefts. They are men of good reputation. I
believe it is only necessary to call their attention to the lack of precautionary measures
and that the proper remedy will be applied."
4
'
The court thereupon concluded:
"Tested by the law applicable hereto, I hold that the defendants acquired the bonds
in bad faith. Though they had no actual knowledge of the theft, the appearance of this
immature, diseased, and degenerate boy, claiming to be the owner of the bonds and in
business for himself, was sufficient to deny his right to the bonds to the mind of any
person with ordinary discrimination, or at least to thrust the duty upon the defendants
to make further inquiries. They had no right to deliberately shut their eyes to obvious
facts."42
In Soma v. Handrulis,43 the Court of Appeals had occasion again to
employ the commercial bad faith concept when it dealt with the possible
liability of the Federal Reserve Bank which had taken a diverted
negotiable instrument for collection. The court stated:
"Even if the actual good faith of the Federal Reserve Bank in dealing with the
instrument is not questioned, if the facts shown by the instrument itself should have
led it to inquire, and by inquiry it would have discovered the true situation, in com-
mercial sense it acted in bad faith and the law will withhold from it such protection
as it would otherwise have been entitled to receive. We think the indorsement by the
payee showing that she retained legal ownership of the check and its proceeds, coupled
with the indorsement in blank of Sarah Alkoff importing ownership in her, put the
bank on inquiry. Inquiry would have disclosed the irregular transaction and would
have shown the theft of the check. Failure to make this inquiry establishes, in a legal
and commercial sense, bad faith on the part of the bank and makes it liable to plaintiff
for the diversion and loss of the check and its proceeds. .... -44
As recently as 1952, the same approach appears in a lower court
action45 involving a stolen check which was cashed by the defendant who
was in the check cashing business. In denying the defendant's claim
that he was a holder in due course, the court held:
"The defendant offered no proof whatsoever of the identity of the person from whom
he acquired the check, nor of any inquiry by him to ascertain the right of that person
to negotiate the instrument. It would be reasonable to expect that one in the check
cashing business, subject to license by the Banking Department of the State, would
obtain the endorsement and some identification of the person presenting the check to
be cashed. One would reasonably expect that this measure of precaution would be
taken in the usual course of the business of cashing checks. The defendant did not
attempt to explain why this was not done in this instance.
41. Id. at 741, 181 N.Y. Supp. at 914.
42. Id. at 743, 181 N.Y. Supp. at 915.
43. 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E.2d 46 (1938).
44. Id. at 233, 14 N.E.2d at 50.
45. Geisinger v. Flamberg, 203 Misc. 214, 115 N.Y.S.2d 324. (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1952).
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"The court is constrained to find on the record of this case that the defendant is
chargeable with gross negligence or wilful ignorance either of which is construed to be
lack of good faith. .... "46
VI. COmmERCI-L BAD FAITH PROBLEm
A consideration of the reasoning in the above representative opinions
leads to the conclusion that the "commercial bad faith" concept found
in New York law was originally invented by jurists as a means of enabling
them, at least indirectly, to properly apply the law merchant course of
trade-taking requirement in the face of the actual-knowledge notice
standard. The grave danger of this indirect approach lies in the fact that
it can easily be misinterpreted as establishing an objective bad faith
standard4 7 or a bad faith constructive notice concept48 applicable to all
commercial due course holding determinations.
Despite this danger, unless course of trade taking can be recognized as
a requirement in itself for due course holding under the N.I.L., it would
seem that this commercial good faith concept is the only solution to the
problem of how to deny the protection of the actual knowledge notice
standard to those who are primarily engaged in the business of discounting
commercial paper.
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated the tremendous difficulties
which have been encountered in judicial attempts to correctly state the
course of business taking requirement of the law merchant. The failure
of the N.I.L. to expressly state or define such requirement is therefore
quite understandable, particularly in view of the fact that if it is correctly
interpreted, the present statute provides a more than adequate solution
to the problem without the necessity of further clarification.
It is submitted that section 52 of the N.I.L. may be interpreted as being
no more than a restatement of the accepted transfer procedure of the com-
mercial paper discount trade. The specific requirements that the instru-
ment be regular and complete and that it be taken by negotiation prior
to maturity for value in good faith and without notice, merely establish in
themselves the general requirement that the instrument be taken in the
course of such trade. Had section 52 stated that a course of business
taking was a further requirement for due course holding it could only
have been interpreted as codifying the erroneous common law cases which
46. Id. at 215, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
47. See State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.Y.
1951), 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953). (On appeal the case was reversed in part. However,
the lower court discussion of good faith concepts was undisturbed.)
48. See Kelso & Co. v. Ellis, 224 N.Y. 528, 121 N.E. 364 (1918).
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required that the instrument be taken in the course of the purchaser's
particular business.49
Since under this interpretation a course of discount trade taking re-
quirement is the very essence of section 52 of the N.I.L., it necessarily
follows that parties who are primarily engaged in the business of discount-
ing commercial paper should be required to conform to the reasonable
trade practices of the banking trade as a prerequisite for due course
holding. Parties who are not so primarily engaged need only establish
their conformity to the transfer procedure of the discount trade as codified
in section 52 of the N.I.L. As established in section 56 of the N.I.L., the
course of business aspect of any transaction related to the discount
transaction is properly admissible as evidence only on the question of the
bad faith of the purchaser and is never conclusive in itself on such
question since bad faith is determined by a subjective standard.
A. Stare Decisis Objection
This novel interpretation will of course meet with immediate and
vigorous objection from banking interests as a whole. A requirement that
banking purchases of commercial paper conform only to an actual knowl-
edge notice standard, or at most to a standard as vague in concept as
"commercial bad faith", is much less onerous than a requirement that
such purchases comply with the reasonable trade practices and usual
customs of the banking industry. This is especially true in light of the
fact that many such practices and customs are dictated by state banking
departments and state and national bank legislation.
It is quite likely, therefore, that stare decisis will be the main objection
advanced by the banking interests to this proposed solution. It will no
doubt be argued that any such interpretation of section 52 is an absurdity,
if only because it has never been consciously advanced nor expressly
recognized in any recorded due course holding determination. Good faith
has always been the controlling issue when the due course holding status
of banks has been questioned, and to disturb such binding precedent by
a new and untried interpretation would in effect create even more uncer-
tainty than that which possibly exists under the present approach.
B. Objection Refuted
The simple answer to this objection is that stare decisis gives support
rather than opposition to the proposed interpretation. This support can
be found in a large body of precedent that has developed in connection
49. Wisconsin is the one state which expressly required a course of business taking for
due course holding. Wis. St. § 116, 57 (1923). It appears that it has only been used, however,
in connection with bank holders. See Union State Bank v. Savord, 186 Wis. 365, 202 N.W.
688 (1925).
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with the application of the doctrine of Price v. Neal.-" Under this doctrine,
if a drawee accepts or pays a bill, he is estopped from denying the genu-
ineness of the drawer's signature. This estoppel is not involked when the
presenting holder knows of the forgery and conceals such fact from
the drawee.al Since a holder in due course does not have this knowledge,
the doctrine permits him to retain the money mistakenly paid by the
acceptor.
It is interesting to note that there are literally hundreds of opinions in
all jurisdictions both before and after the N.I.L. which rule that when
the presenting holder is a bank or financial institution, its negligence in
failing to make proper inquiry at the time it purchased the forged paper
will permit the acceptor to recover the money paid to such holder.12 In
effect, it has been uniformly held in litigation involving the doctrine
of Price v. Neal that a bank or financial institution cannot establish
itself as a holder in due course and thus gain the protection of the rule's
estoppel unless it takes the instrument in conformity with ordinary bank-
ing practice53
A concise statement of such reasoning is contained in the case of Bank
of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank.!4 In discussing the application
of the Price v. Neal doctrine when the presenting holder was a bank, the
court stated:
50. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
51. Professor Aigler concedes that "a successful defendant holder in this situation mutt
be one with the negative virtue of not being a participator or a bad faith taker." Aigler,
Price v. Neal Under the N.I.L., 2S Mlich. L. Rev. 743, 746 (1930).
52. American Surety Co. v. Industrial Say. Bank 242 Mich. 581, 219 N.W. 69 (1923);
First Nat'l Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547 (1921); First
Nat'l Bank v. Brule Nat'l Bank, 41 S.D. 87, 16S NV. 1054 (1918); Commercial and Say.
Bank Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 68 Ind. App. 417, 120 N.. 670 (1913); State Nat'l Ban]:
v. Bank of Mlagdalina, 21 N.M. 653, 157 Pac. 498 (1916); First Nat'1 Bank v. Bank of
Wyndmere, 15 ND. 299, 103 N.W. 546 (1906).
53. Research reveals one case, Pennington County Bank v. First State Bank, 110 Minn.
263, 265, 125, N.W. 119, 121 (1910) wherein it could be argued that the actual knowledge
notice standard influenced a contrary decision. It is evident however from the opinion that
the majority of the bench was confused by the seeming conflict between the due course
adjudications and the recovery decisions. The court stated, "The one circumstance here which
can be claimed to have put the defendant upon inquiry was that Davis was an entire
stranger. Such fact had been held not enough to show bad faith (citing Murray v. Lardner).
Notwithstanding those authorities, I am personally of the opinion that, before a bank takes
negotiable paper from a stranger and puts it off, either as owner or for collection, it is
necessary for it, in order that it be considered a bona fide holder, to satisfy itself by reason-
able inquiry as to the validity of the paper and that whether this defendant did take such
reasonable precaution was a question for the jury. But a majority of the court held that
the evidence was insufficient to justify a finding that the defendant was not a bona fide
holder of the check and therefore the learned trial judge properly instructed a verdict for
the defendant."
54. 66 W. Va. 545, 66 S.E. 761 (1909).
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"The general practice of bankers to make reasonable inquiry as to the identity of
the payee in purchasing commercial paper is matter of common knowledge and judicial
cognizance. Therefore the indorsement of a purchasing bank, not qualified or limited
in any respect, amounts to a representation to the drawee that this precaution has
been taken. Upon that indorsement, the drawee has the right to rely to that extent,
and, if identification has not been required, the indorsement amounts to an imposition
by the purchasing bank upon the drawee ....
In Louisa National Bank v. Kentucky National Bank,"0 the court per-
mitted the acceptor to recover the mistaken payment from the holder
bank and made the following typical observation:
"The appellant, when the check was presented to it by Benfield, failed to make any
inquiry of or about him, and did not cause or have him to be identified. Its act in so
paying to him the check is a degree of negligence on its part equivalent to positive
negligence. It indorsed the check, and, while such indorsement may not be regarded
within the meaning of the Negotiable Instrument Law as amounting to a warranty to
appellant of that which it indorsed, it at least substantially served as a representation
to it that it had exercised ordinary care and had complied with the rules and customs
of prudent banking. .... 2,57
While these cases are unique since they deal with forgery, which is
usually a real defense even against holders in due course and while they
may be distinguished in that their main issue did not directly involve due
course holding determination, the fact remains that they require an
investigatory duty of those primarily in the discount business prior to the
purchase of commercial paper. This duty is recognized as the basis
for the negligence which prevents the estoppel ordinarily applicable under
the doctrine. It is therefore submitted that the proposed interpretation
of section 52 has ample support in precedent. While novel in presentation,
the interpretation is actually no more than a recognition of an approach
which has existed rather obscurely in law for many years.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It may therefore be concluded that "commercial bad faith" has no place
in negotiable instruments law. The sole test under the N.I.L. to determine
due course holding status is whether the instrument is taken in the course
of the discount trade, in good faith and without actual knowledge of facts
which in themselves establish a legal defense or title defect in the in-
strument.
55. Id. at 550, 66 S.E. at 763.
56. 239 Ky. 302, 39 S.W.2d 497 (1931).
57. Id. at 311, 39 S.W.2d at 501.
